Damaged Goods: Why, In Light of the Supreme Court\u27s Recent Punitive Damages Jurisprudence, Congress Must Amend the Federal Rules of Evidence by Vitale, Michael S.
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 58 Issue 4 Article 7 
5-2005 
Damaged Goods: Why, In Light of the Supreme Court's Recent 
Punitive Damages Jurisprudence, Congress Must Amend the 
Federal Rules of Evidence 
Michael S. Vitale 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Evidence Commons, and the Jurisprudence Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michael S. Vitale, Damaged Goods: Why, In Light of the Supreme Court's Recent Punitive Damages 
Jurisprudence, Congress Must Amend the Federal Rules of Evidence, 58 Vanderbilt Law Review 1405 
(2019) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol58/iss4/7 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, 
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
Damaged Goods: Why, In Light of the
Supreme Court's Recent Punitive
Damages Jurisprudence, Congress
Must Amend the Federal Rules of
Evidence
1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................... 1406
II. BACKGROU ND ..................................................................... 1408
A. The Supreme Court's Pre-BMW Punitive
Damages Jurisprudence ......................................... 1408
1. Bankers Life and Browning-Ferris .............. 1408
2. H a slip .......................................................... 1409
3. TX O .............................................................. 14 10
4 . O berg ............................................................ 14 11
B. How Gore and State Farm Changed the
Punitive Damages Landscape ................................. 1412
III. GORE AND STATE FARM HAVE SET A NEW
CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD THAT REQUIRES A
NEW FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE PERTAINING
TO PUNITIVE DAMAGES CASES ............................................ 1415
IV. EVEN IF GORE AND STATE FARM DO NOT REQUIRE
A NEW RULE OF EVIDENCE, STATE AND FEDERAL
EVIDENTIARY RULES SHOULD BE AMENDED ANYWAY,
AS A MATTER OF SOUND POLICY ......................................... 1419
A. Practical Arguments for Change ............................ 1419
B. Policy Arguments for Change ................................. 1424
V. CONTENTS AND APPLICATION OF THE NEW RULE ............... 1430
A. Suggested Contents of the New Rule ...................... 1430
1. The Rule should only apply where
punitive damages are "in play... ................. 1431
2. The Rule should make clear that it is
triggered when evidence is proffered to
demonstrate extraterritorial conduct,
conduct which was legal where it occurred,
and conduct which fails the "nexus"
requirement of State Farm .......................... 1431
1405
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:4:1405
3. The Rule should impose a more
stringent balancing test that displaces
the test required by Rule 403 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence ........................... 1432
B. Application of the New Rule ................................... 1435
V I. C ON CLU SION ....................................................................... 1440
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the 1980s, a wide range of courts and commentators have
expressed concern over large punitive damages awards handed out by
civil juries against a wide array of tortfeasors. A late 2001 study
revealed that from 1985 to 2001, eight multi-billion dollar punitive
damages awards were granted, with four of them being handed down
in the years 1999 to 2001 alone.' Not surprisingly, all but one of these
verdicts were handed down against large corporations. 2 Among the
current members of the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice John Paul
Stevens in particular has regularly noted the especially dangerous
tendency the current punitive damages regime poses:
We have admonished that "[p]unitive damages pose an acute danger of arbitrary
deprivation of property. Jury instructions typically leave the jury with wide discretion
in choosing amounts, and the presentation of evidence of a defendant's net worth creates
the potential that juries will use their verdicts to express biases against big businesses,
particularly those without strong local presences."
3
While many commentators note that punitive damages awards
are still so rare that this should not pose a concern, others disagree,
and still others posit that an even more pressing threat is the havoc
that expectations of punitive damages awards can wreak on
settlement negotiations. 4
Within the past nine years, the United States Supreme Court
has issued two landmark tort decisions, BMW of North America v.
1. Richard W. Murphy, Punitive Damages, Explanatory Verdicts, and the Hard Look, 76
WASH. L. REV. 995, 996 (2001).
2. Id. at 997-98. The one exception was a multi-billion dollar punitive damages verdict
levied against a doctor who helped to subject almost forty plaintiffs (or their relatives) to rape,
torture, and genocide. Id. at 996.
3. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 (2003) (quoting Honda
Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 432 (1994)) (discussing the tendency of punitive damages
awards to create a concern "over the imprecise manner in which punitive damages systems are
administered").
4. See, e.g., Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Determining Punitive Damages: Empirical Insights
and Implications for Reform, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 103, 174-75 (2002) (reviewing a study finding that
litigants are less likely to settle when punitive damages are uncapped, because of a greater
disparity between the plaintiffs' and defendants' estimates of trial outcomes).
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Gore, and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell,
holding in both instances that excessive punitive damages awards,
which were upheld by their respective state supreme courts, violated
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States. 5 In light of the fact-specific nature
of these cases, as well as the Court's refusal to adopt a bright-line rule
as to when punitive damages awards should be deemed excessive, 6
questions remain regarding the precedential value of these cases and
if the principles they espouse will be applied faithfully by the state
courts that review punitive damages verdicts. In fact, it is unclear
whether these two decisions will have any effect at all in causing
lower courts to rein in punitive damages awards in post-verdict
appellate review. 7 The Supreme Court itself has acknowledged this
worry, stating that "[b]ecause no two cases are truly identical,
meaningful comparisons of such awards are difficult to make."8
With these worries in mind, many commentators have
suggested imposing additional constraints to reduce the risk of
excessive punitive damages rendered by juries, or alternatively, to
make such awards easier to strike down once they are rendered. 9
Somewhat surprisingly, the Supreme Court entered the fray in Gore
by identifying a limit on excessive punitive damages awards imposed
by substantive due process. 10 While Gore and its progeny ostensibly
focus on after-the-fact checks on civil juries, this Note asserts that a
more prudent and efficient means of ensuring reasonable and "non-
5. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 429; BMW of No. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574-75 (1996).
For further discussion of the Gore and State Farm cases, see infra Section II. The Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reads: "nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1.
6. E.g., Gore, 517 U.S. at 582-83; TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 458
(1993) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991).
7. See, e.g., Michael A. Burch, We've Only Just Begun: The Impact of Remand Orders from
Higher to Lower Courts on American Jurisprudence, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 493, 496 n.12, 507 n.85
(2004) (discussing the precedential effect of the Supreme Court's opinion on various California
cases remanded for decision after State Farm).
8. TXO, 509 U.S. at 457 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion). In her dissenting opinion, Justice
O'Connor recognized the same fear, stating that "[b]ecause no two cases are alike, not all
comparisons will be enlightening." Id. at 483 (O'Connor, J.,dissenting).
9. See generally Murphy, supra note 1 (calling for states to amend their rules of evidence,
and for Congress to amend Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) to require juries to return special
verdicts in punitive damages cases and to cite specific reasons for their decisions, thus
facilitating more meaningful judicial review of punitive damages awards by appellate courts).
For a discussion of the potential role of judges in assessing punitive damages awards vis-A-vis
juries, see Colleen P. Murphy, Judicial Assessment of Legal Remedies, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 153,
181-86, 193-202 (1999).
10. Gore, 517 U.S. at 562.
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excessive" punitive damages verdicts would be to prevent juries from
even hearing the type of evidence that Gore and State Farm chastised
trial courts for admitting in the first place. The most effective way to
accomplish this constitutionally required goal would be to have
Congress amend the Federal Rules of Evidence to take some discretion
away from trial judges in situations analogous to Gore and State
Farm. In particular, the Federal Rules should be amended to render
inadmissible all types of evidence describing wrongful conduct by the
defendant which: (1) bears minimal relation to the tort at issue; (2)
occurred in another jurisdiction; (3) was legal when and where it
occurred; or (4) for some other reason has no "nexus to the specific
harm suffered by the plaintiff."11
This Note will begin by offering in Part II a brief overview of
the punitive damages landscape, and how the determination of
whether a punitive damages award is "grossly disproportionate" was
changed by Gore and State Farm. Next, Part III will argue that these
two cases, by invoking the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to strike down awards based on evidence admitted
pursuant to state procedural rules, requires Congress and state
legislatures to draft a new rule of evidence that presumes that these
types of aforementioned evidence must be excluded from trial in cases
where punitive damages are sought. In Part IV, this Note will then
explore the alternative argument that even if a new rule is not
constitutionally mandated, a new Federal Rule of Evidence along
these lines should nevertheless be added as a matter of sound policy.
Finally, Part V of this Note will suggest the substance of the new rule
and apply it to specific examples from prior cases.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Supreme Court's Pre-BMW Punitive Damages Jurisprudence
1. Bankers Life and Browning-Ferris
In the late 1980s, several tort defendants who were held liable
for seven-figure punitive damages verdicts sought judicial review
alleging, inter alia, that the sheer amount of punitive damages levied
against them was so excessive as to violate the Due Process Clause of
11. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422 (2003).
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the Fourteenth Amendment. 12 In the first of these cases, Bankers Life
and Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, the Supreme Court simply declined to
address the question, stating that it would not be prudent to review
the issue at that time, as the issue was a secondary argument that
was not given much attention in the parties' briefs or at oral
argument. 13
The following year, in Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont,
Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., the Supreme Court expressly rejected an
Eighth Amendment argument that certain awards might be deemed
"excessive fines," but again refused to decide the due process issue, in
part because the petitioners failed to raise the argument before the
lower courts and again failed to mention it in their petition for
certiorari. 14 In a departure from Bankers Life, however, several of the
Justices "wondered aloud" whether the award of such a high amount
of punitive damages could potentially violate a defendant's Fourteenth
Amendment right not to be deprived of property "without due process
of law."15 Justices Brennan and Marshall, in a concurring opinion,
indicated some support for the proposition that "the Due Process
Clause forbids damages awards that are 'grossly excessive,' " and
stated that they joined the majority only on the understanding that in
some instances, the Fourteenth Amendment constrains punitive
damages verdicts. 16 In a separate concurrence, Justices O'Connor and
Stevens relayed that they shared Justice Brennan's view, but went
further in indicating that the Court's opinion also did not foreclose a
due process challenge to the "method by which [punitive damages
awards] are imposed." 17
2. Haslip
With the new decade came a new stance by the Supreme Court
on punitive damages and the Due Process clause. In 1991, in Pacific
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,18 an insurance company alleged
that a punitive damages award levied against it after its agent
defrauded a municipality in the sale of health insurance policies
violated the Due Process Clause. Though they upheld the award, a
12. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 276 (1989); Bankers Life &
Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 76 (1988).
13. 486 U.S. at 88 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
14. 492 U.S. at 275-77.
15. JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG ET AL., TORT LAW: RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS 971 (2004).
16. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 280 (Brennan, J., concurring).
17. Id. at 283 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
18. 499 U.S. 1, 1 (1991).
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substantial majority of the Supreme Court posited that the Due
Process Clause requires adequate procedural safeguards if the
imposition of punitive damages were to survive judicial review. 19
Hence, although the court upheld the common-law method for
assessing punitive damages in Haslip, it hinted that future challenges
to the imposition of punitive damages could succeed.20 Writing for the
Court, Justice Blackmun stated, "[i]t would be... inappropriate to say
that, because punitive damages have been recognized for so long, their
imposition is never unconstitutional. We note again our concern about
punitive damages that 'run wild.' "21 With this in mind, the Court
reasoned that punitive damages must have an "understandable
relationship to compensatory damages," and opined that an award
where punitive damages were more than four times greater than
actual damages was "close to the line" of constitutional
permissibility.22  In essence, the Court seemed to foreclose Due
Process challenges against the common-law punitive damages regime
in general, but seemed willing to entertain challenges related to the
specific imposition of punitive damages to an individual defendant,
both in terms of the procedures used and the amount of the award
itself.
3. TXO
Two years later, in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources
Corp., the Court seemed to both move forward and retreat from some
of its earlier language in Haslip. In moving forward, several members
of the Court, in a case involving a slander of title claim resulting in a
$10 million punitive damages award, but only $19,000 in
compensatory damages, stated more explicitly that the Due Process
Clause not only mandates adequate procedural protections for
defendants, but also "sets a substantive limit" on the amount of the
19. GOLDBERG, supra note 15, at 971. This "substantial majority" consisted of seven of the
eight Justices participating in the case-Chief Justice Rehnquist and Associate Justices
Blackmun, White, Marshall, Stevens, Kennedy, and O'Connor. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 2, 23-24.
Justice Souter took no part in the case, but would later acquiesce in this view in BMW of No.
Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 586-87 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring). Only Justice Scalia would
not go as far. Concurring separately, Scalia stated that the common law process at issue in the
case, which had predated the drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment and was not alleged to have
violated the Bill of Rights, necessarily constituted due process and thus no further inquiry into
its "reasonableness" was needed. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 24-25.
20. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 17-18.
21. Id. at 18 (citations omitted).
22. Id. at 22-23.
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punitive damages verdict. 23  Moving backward, however, the Court
failed to strike down this punitive damages award, which was 526
times greater than the amount of compensatory damages awarded to
the plaintiff,24 or, in other words, a ratio over 130 times greater than
that which the Court stated in Haslip was "close to the line" of
unconstitutionality. 25 In an effort to explain this retreat, the majority
pointed to several facts which suggested that this case was far from
the average punitive damages case. The Court pointed to the fact that
a mathematical bright-line rule would be counterproductive, that the
defendant's tortious conduct in TXO was found to be willful and
malicious, and that, if successful, the "illicit scheme" attempted by the
tortfeasors could potentially have resulted in actual damages in excess
of the punitive damages award, bringing the ratio down to one-to-one
or smaller.26
This rationale, however, failed to satisfy at least three
members of the Court. Justice Kennedy urged the majority to
formulate a new test for determining "grossly excessive" penalties, but
felt that he could not dissent from the opinion. 27 He reasoned that
because this defendant committed an intentional tort, that fact alone
may be enough to satisfy Due Process in the absence of a more specific
test of "reasonableness."28  Justices O'Connor and White dissented,
stating that the size of the award suggested it was the product of bias
or passion, and that without a greater level of constitutional scrutiny,
"the Court's judgment renders Haslip's promise a false one."29
4. Oberg
The final punitive damages case before Gore was the first in
which the Supreme Court used the Due Process Clause to reverse a
23. GOLDBERG, supra note 15, at 971. The Court, a year later, assented to the proposition
that a plurality of the Court in TXO, as well as Justice O'Connor, had suggested, namely that "
'grossly excessive' punitive damages would violate due process." Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512
U.S. 415, 420 (1994).
24. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 453, 462 (1993).
25. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23.
26. TXO, 509 U.S. at 458, 462 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion). In this case, the defendant
repeatedly misrepresented the nature and quality of property they wished to sell to the
plaintiffs. Id. at 446-450. In upholding the award, the majority appeared to give substantial
weight to the fact that the plaintiffs claimed their "potential loss" could have topped $1 million,
that the defendant acted "with malice" toward the plaintiffs, and that their repeated efforts
demonstrated a "pattern and practice" of attempted fraud in their dealings with the plaintiffs.
Id. at 462, 468-69.
27. Id. at 466-68. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
28. Id. at 468-69.
29. Id. at 472-73, 481-82 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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punitive damages award, though the Court refused to hold the award
itself substantively unreasonable. 30 In Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg,
seven members of the Court agreed that an amendment to the Oregon
Constitution prohibiting judicial revision of punitive damages awards
unless there was "no evidence to support the verdict" violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 31 Although the Court
failed to examine whether the amount of the punitive damages award
at issue in the case-which amounted to a ratio of almost seven-to-
one 32-violated substantive due process, the majority definitively
stated that Haslip stood for the proposition that the Constitution does
impose a limit on the size of punitive damage awards. 33 Thus, Oberg
set the stage for determining two years later how punitive damages
awards are "excessive" under the Due Process Clause.
B. How Gore and State Farm Changed the Punitive Damages
Landscape
BMW v. Gore truly was a landmark case. In Gore, the Court
held unconstitutional a multimillion dollar punitive damages award
based on an intentional corporate decision to not disclose to buyers the
repainting of luxury cars which had sustained minimal cosmetic
damage en route to the United States.34 Not only did the Supreme
Court fulfill the "promise" of Haslip by finally striking down a
punitive damages award as violative of the Due Process Clause, but
the majority also formulated a balancing test for determining when
punitive damages awards are excessive. The three Gore "guideposts"
for determining the excessiveness of a punitive damages award
included: (1) the reprehensibility of the act in question; (2) the ratio of
punitive to compensatory damages; and (3) a comparison of the
punitive damages award to comparable civil and criminal sanctions
which could apply to comparable misconduct. 35 The rationale given for
articulating such a test is that the Due Process Clause dictates that a
person should receive fair notice not only of the conduct that subjects
30. See Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 415 (1994) (focusing the inquiry "on
Oregon's departure from traditional procedures").
31. Id. at 418.
32. Although some commentators describe the ratio involved in this case as just over five-
to-one, it should be noted that the amount of compensatory damages actually paid out to the
plaintiff amounted to just over $735,000 after being reduced due to a finding of contributory
negligence by Oberg. As the punitive damages amounted to $5 million, the actual ratio is closer
to seven-to-one. Id. at 418.
33. Id. at 420.
34. BMW of No. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585-86 (1996).
35. Id. at 575, 580, 583.
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him to punishment, but also of the potential severity of the penalty for
such conduct. 36 These guideposts provide the requisite indicia that
defendants had "adequate notice of the magnitude of the sanction."37
Perhaps the most important aspect of the Court's decision in
Gore, at least for purposes of this discussion, was its handling of the
evidentiary issues pertaining to the newly enunciated guideposts. In
Gore, the Court used several rationales to express why it was error to
introduce evidence, for purposes of assessing punitive damages, of the
fact that BMW instituted a nationwide policy of repainting minimally
damaged cars without disclosing this fact to prospective buyers. 38
First, in concluding the reprehensibility of BMW's conduct was
relatively low, the Court pointed to the fact that Gore argued at trial
that BMW's nondisclosure of cosmetic repairs to his car "formed part
of a nationwide pattern of tortious conduct."39 The Court, however,
faulted this argument because BMW's conduct was legal in many of
the jurisdictions where it took place.40  Furthermore, the Court
frowned on punishing the defendant for non-material omissions which
took place outside of the jurisdiction where the suit was initiated,
wholly apart from whether or not the conduct was tortious. 41
Similarly, with regard to the "comparable sanctions" guidepost,
the Court again faulted Gore's "nationwide conduct" argument, noting
that even if the Court were prepared to consider BMW's conduct in
other jurisdictions in evaluating the punitive damages award,
statutory penalties for similar malfeasance approached nothing near a
multimillion dollar penalty. 42  The Court concluded with the
admonishment that "[w]hile each State has ample power to protect its
own consumers, none may use the punitive damages deterrent as a
means of imposing its regulatory policies on the entire Nation. '43
Similarly, and more openly, evidentiary issues played a major
part in the reversal of a punitive damages award reviewed de novo in
State Farm.44 In striking down the award, which the Court found was
36. Id. at 574.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 563-64.
39. Id. at 576.
40. Id. at 573.
41. Id. at 579-80, 585.
42. Id. at 584.
43. Id. at 585.
44. In the interim between Gore and State Farm, the Supreme Court held that appellate
courts should engage in de novo review of punitive damages awards. In particular, the Court
noted that the application of the Gore guideposts to the jury's award should be subjected to
"exacting" de novo review. See Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 431
(2001). The Court reasoned that "[b]ecause the jury's award of punitive damages does not
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probably based in part on dissimilar out-of-state conduct by the
defendant insurer, the Court held that the "reprehensibility" prong of
the Gore test was miscalculated due to the introduction of "perceived
deficiencies of State Farm's operations throughout the country," much
of which had little or no relation to the tort at issue in the case, and
some of which was not proscribed by law where it occurred. 45 "Lawful
out-of-state conduct," the Court admonished, "may be probative when
it demonstrates the deliberateness and culpability of the defendant's
action in the state where it is tortious, but that conduct must have a
nexus to the specific harm suffered by the plaintiff."46 Furthermore,
the Court added, "Due Process does not permit courts, in the
calculation of punitive damages, to adjudicate the merits of other
parties' hypothetical claims against a defendant under the guise of the
reprehensibility analysis."47  Finally, under the "comparable
sanctions" guidepost, the majority again agreed that this portion was
not sufficient to justify the 145-to-one punitive-to-compensatory ratio,
as the Supreme Court of Utah again brought in evidence of State
Farm's out-of-state, unrelated conduct in determining if the punitive
damages penalty squared with comparable civil and criminal
penalties. 48
Arguably, the inadmissible evidence admitted by the respective
trial courts in State Farm and Gore constituted the main reason why
these two landmark decisions came out differently than the TXO case.
The Court in Gore was quick to point out under its discussion of the
"reprehensibility" guidepost that willful fraud was the primary reason
TXO was the outlier, but this argument seems disingenuous,
considering the fact that Gore and State Farm also involved
constitute a finding of 'fact,' appellate review of the district court's determination that an award
is consistent with due process does not implicate the Seventh Amendment concerns raised by
respondent." Id. at 437. The Court was particularly concerned with trial courts mishandling the
third BMW guidepost, comparative civil fines and criminal penalties, stating that "the third Gore
criterion, which calls for a broad legal comparison, seems more suited to the expertise of
appellate courts. Considerations of institutional competence therefore fail to tip the balance in
favor of deferential appellate review." Id. at 440.
45. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 420 (2003). The Court
expressed displeasure that the trial court allowed evidence which was both extraterritorial and
had nothing to do with fraud or automobile insurance claims. Id. at 422-24. In particular, the
Court noted that the plaintiff was permitted to present evidence about the insurer's investigation
into the personal lives of one of its employees, how they denied claims by insureds throughout
the country, and in general how the insurer's policies had a tendency to corrupt its workers. Id.
at 424.
46. Id. at 422.
47. Id. at 423.
48. Id. at 428.
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allegations of willful fraud by the tortfeasor-defendants. 49
Furthermore, all three cases involved purely economic harm only,
which the Supreme Court has stated provides for a lesser degree of
reprehensibility than physical harm.50  In addition, the ratio of
punitive damages to compensatory damages was actually the highest
in TXO, making the fact pattern impossible to distinguish on this
ground as well.51 Of course, one could argue that the most pertinent
difference between TXO on one hand and Gore and State Farm on the
other was that the ratio of potential punitive damages to actual
damages made the ratio much lower in TXO, but this argument
should also fail because, as the Supreme Court indicated in Gore, the
"reprehensibility" prong must be given greater weight than the "ratio"
guidepost. 52
The significance of this argument is clear-if admitting the
type of evidence the Supreme Court openly criticized in Gore and State
Farm was the deciding factor (or at least a deciding factor) in holding
that the Due Process Clause mandates overriding these punitive
damages verdicts due to their excessiveness, then Gore and State
Farm either persuasively suggest or presumptively require that rules
of evidence be amended so that this type of evidence is excluded in the
first place. This proposition is examined further in the following
sections.
III. GORE AND STATE FARM HAVE SET A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL
STANDARD THAT REQUIRES A NEW FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE
PERTAINING TO PUNITIVE DAMAGES CASES
"There is no specific rule that governs evidence about the
amount of punitive damages," and, for the most part, evidentiary
decisions are governed by general principles of federal evidence law
and their state equivalents.53 Currently, the admission of evidence
49. See id. at 415, BMW of No. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 579 (1996); GOLDBERG,
supra note 15, at 982 (discussing the general applicability of the Gore guideposts). Note that
since all three cases involved fraudulent misrepresentations or omissions, this also means that
under the "comparable sanctions" guidepost of Gore, all three cases would have resulted in
similar civil and criminal penalties, making TXO impossible to distinguish on this ground as
well.
50. Gore, 517 U.S. at 575-76.
51. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 453 (1993) (526 to 1 ratio); Gore,
517 U.S. at 582 (500 to 1 ratio); State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425 (145 to 1 ratio).
52. Gore, 517 U.S. at 575.
53. David Crump, Evidence, Economics, and Ethics: What Information Should Jurors Be
Given to Determine the Amount of a Punitive-Damage Award?, 57 MD. L. REV. 174, 215 (1998).
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similar to that at issue in Gore and State Farm would be governed by
Rules 401, 402, and 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and similar
provisions of state evidence law.54 Rule 401 is very lenient, declaring
relevant any evidence that has "any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable" than if it was not admitted. 55 Rule 402
simply states that all relevant evidence is admissible, subject of
course, to other federal law.56 Rule 403, however, requires a somewhat
more stringent inquiry, even though it is weighted in favor of
admissibility.5 7 Rule 403 requires trial judges to exclude relevant
evidence when "its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues," the potential of
misleading the jury, or waste of time.58
Thus, federal evidentiary rules and their state equivalents give
the trial court an opportunity, in its discretion, to exclude the type of
evidence at issue in Gore and State Farm, such as legal
extraterritorial evidence and evidence of conduct with no "nexus to the
specific harm suffered by the plaintiff,"59 before they are ever
presented at trial. It follows from these rules that the only reason
these pieces of evidence were admitted was that the respective trial
judges in Gore and State Farm, at least implicitly, made the
evidentiary decision that these types of evidence withstood the 403
balancing test. The Supreme Court, especially in State Farm,
concluded the opposite, indicating that legal out-of-state conduct
which fails the "nexus" test is inadmissible for the purpose of
determining the proper amount of punitive damages to assess.60
Otherwise, a court would be in serious danger of unconstitutionally
54. See infra notes 55-56, 58, and accompanying text. Note that this is assuming the
evidence would not be barred by an independent rule of evidence, such as those barring evidence
of prior bad acts or subsequent remedial measures when offered for certain reasons, evidence of
past convictions, and hearsay problems, but this Note assumes that no such concerns come into
play, as they did not in Gore or State Farm.
55. FED. R. EVID. 401. The comments to the rule even go as far as to declare that "[alny
more stringent requirement is unworkable and unrealistic." See id. adv. comm. note.
56. FED. R. EVID. 402. The rule also states the converse; that all "[e]vidence which is not
relevant is not admissible." Id.
57. Crump, supra note 53, at 216.
58. FED. R. EVID. 403 (emphasis added). For a judicial application of the rule, see Old Chief
v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997). Almost every state has an identical or similar evidentiary
rule. For instance, the rule in Kansas is Kansas Code of Civil Procedure § 60-445, the rule in
New Jersey is New Jersey Rule 4, and the rule in California is California Evidence Code § 352.
See FED. R. EVID. 403 adv. comm. note.
59. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422 (2003).
60. Id.
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punishing a defendant for action that was lawful where it occurred. 61
Such evidence, the Court concluded, prejudiced and misled the jury to
the point where it "awarded punitive damages to punish and deter
conduct that bore no relation to the [the plaintiffs'] harm."62
The Supreme Court's holding, without saying so explicitly,
creates a powerful inference that the Federal Rules of Evidence must,
or at least should, be amended, as the current regime fails to provide
adequate protection against the introduction of certain types of
evidence deemed inadmissible by the Court in State Farm. Based on
the language used in the case, the new rule must state that the type of
evidence admitted at trial in Gore and State Farm, such as legal
extraterritorial conduct and conduct unrelated to the tort at issue,
always has a tendency to prejudice or mislead the jury in a way that
substantially outweighs any probative value the evidence may have.
This is in essence what the Supreme Court declared in State Farm
when it used the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
overrule the Utah Supreme Court's decision, making it clear that
punitive damages awards based on unrelated conduct admitted into
evidence "under the guise of the reprehensibility analysis" 63 can
amount to an arbitrary punishment imposed on a tortfeasor. 64
In terms of procedure, there would be no barrier to instituting
a rule which trumped the 403 analysis. Note that the Federal Rules of
Evidence specifically declares several other types of evidence
inadmissible before a trial judge can get to the residual 403 balancing
test. For instance, Rule 802 requires that hearsay evidence not
admissible by an exception to the hearsay rules be deemed
inadmissible, which, of course, operates even if the evidence is highly
probative. 65 The Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 403 admits as
61. Id. at 422-23. In theory, one could make the case that the Supreme Court was simply
saying that the conduct at issue was not relevant, and thus that the trial courts were only
misapplying Rule 401 (or its state equivalent). But this argument is tenuous, at best, because
clearly there is some evidence that has "any tendency" to make a fact at issue more or less
probable, see FED. R. EVID. 401, which fails the "nexus" requirement of State Farm, 538 U.S. 422.
Note that the Court left open whether evidence of illegal, out-of-state conduct may be admitted
at all, but, did admonish that "[n]or, as a general rule, does a State have a legitimate concern in
imposing punitive damages to punish a defendant for unlawful acts committed outside of the
State's jurisdiction." Id. at 421. Note also that this was only a part (although, I would argue, the
biggest part) of the court's rationale. The court also stressed concern over "hypothetical" claims
and spoke in rather vague terms of the idea that making a defendant pay a plaintiff for alleged
wrongs done to an unknown and/or not present third party is problematic. Id. at 422-23.
62. Id. at 422.
63. Id. at 423.
64. Id. at 416-17.
65. FED. R. EVID. 802.
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much, stating that "case law recognizes that certain circumstances
call for the exclusion of evidence which is of unquestioned relevance." 66
While adding a rule of evidence that would be applied before
the Rule 403 inquiry would pose no problem procedurally, there are
potential substantive counterarguments to the proposition that Gore
and State Farm require an amendment to the Federal Rules of
Evidence. First, there is the argument that these two cases simply
provide appellate courts certain points to consider when performing
due process analysis on punitive damages cases against corporate
defendants. Proponents of this viewpoint would argue that the whole
rationale behind Cooper Industries, which was decided post-Gore, was
to provide appellate courts with more of an opportunity to probe
extraterritoriality cases such as Gore, not to require new standards for
trial judges. 67
Another argument would focus on the fact that the State Farm
standard may trump implicit evidentiary decisions in the narrow
sense that constitutional provisions always trump mere evidentiary
rules. Yet this argument would claim that, because the holdings in
Gore and State Farm are narrowly tailored and focus on the
"excessiveness" and "arbitrariness" of the amount of the award rather
than the evidence potentially used by the jury to reach that amount,
the Court was not using Due Process to suggest changes to the
Federal Rules of Evidence. 68 The proper response to this point would
be that within this argument lay its shortcomings. It seems certain
that if the admission of legal, unrelated extraterritorial conduct is so
offensive as to violate Due Process (or to even come close to doing so)
by playing a substantial part in a punitive damages award by
violating a defendant's right to substantive Due Process, then it would
clearly violate the lesser Federal Rule of Evidence. 69 Furthermore,
there is no dearth of language in Gore and State Farm about the
evidentiary errors by the trial court; clearly, there is substantial
evidence that the Supreme Court intended to influence evidentiary
66. FED. R. EVID. 403 adv. comm. note.
67. Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 424 (2001). For a more in
depth discussion of Cooper, see supra note 44.
68. There is some merit in this argument, as the standard in State Farm does focus on
arbitrariness and excessiveness and the Court noted that it was "reluctant to identify concrete
constitutional limits" to its holding, particularly with respect to the second "ratio" guidepost in
Gore. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 416, 424.
69. And such unfair evidence did play a substantial part in both Gore and State Farm. The
plaintiffs claimed that this evidence went to the reprehensibility of the defendants' conduct in
both cases, and the Supreme Court has clearly stated that reprehensibility is the most important
factor in the punitive damages analysis. Id. at 419; BMW of No. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574
n. 21 (1996).
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rulings in punitive damages cases. For instance, at one point in State
Farm, the majority expressed displeasure that the plaintiffs attorney
allowed the trial judge to become "convinced ... that there was no
limitation on the scope of evidence that could be considered" under
Supreme Court precedent. 70 In criticizing this interpretation of Gore
and using the admission of extraterritorial evidence in part to strike
down the punitive damages award in State Farm,71 the Court clearly
signaled that a change in the Federal Rules of Evidence could (and
probably, should) be required.
IV. EVEN IF GORE AND STATE FARM DO NOT REQUIRE A NEW RULE OF
EVIDENCE, STATE AND FEDERAL EVDENTIARY RULES SHOULD BE
AMENDED ANYWAY, AS A MATTER OF SOUND POLICY
A. Practical Arguments for Change
Even if Gore and State Farm do not mandate a change to the
Federal Rules of Evidence, as a practical matter states and the federal
government should amend their rules to reflect the outcome of these
two cases. Within the past few decades, punitive damages awards
have risen in both frequency and amount. 72 Today, numerous
academics have postulated that in many cases, punitive damages
claims have gone from being merely a secondary, "'subordinate,' or
'derivative' claim to being the claim."73 And, with so many millions of
dollars at stake, some scholars have complained that the current state
of the rules leaves too much discretion to trial judges, who abuse this
discretion by giving too much information to the jury along with a
dearth of meaningful standards with which to weigh this
information. 74 This phenomenon, coupled with erratic appellate court
review, makes it likely that the apparent danger of arbitrary
70. Id. at 421.
71. Id. at 421-22.
72. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 1, at 996 ("[J]uries have granted four multi-billion dollar
punitive damages awards over the last few years and eight over the last sixteen years.").
73. Mark A. Klugheit, "Where the Rubber Meets the Road": Theoretical Justification vs.
Practical Outcomes in Punitive Damages Litigation, 52 SYR. L. REV. 803, 807-08 (2002).
74. Crump, supra note 53, at 230-31. Crump notes that this is especially true with respect
to claims against large corporate defendants. Id. at 215-33. But see Valerie P. Hans &
Stephanie Albertson, Empirical Research and Civil Jury Reform, 78 N.D. L. REV. 1497, 1512-19
(discussing the work of scholars such as Theodore Eisenberg, Michael Rustag, and Thomas
Koenig, who see no evidence of a systemic problem).
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deprivation of property will continue absent more direction to the
states regarding punitive damages awards. 75
Another practical problem, arguably even more serious, is that
both trial and appellate judges continually misapply the Gore and
State Farm standards to the detriment of defendants in punitive
damages cases. Perhaps the most notorious instance was when the
trial judge in the State Farm case stated on the record that he read
Gore to advocate that judges should admit even more evidence than
before in punitive damages cases. 76 A brief search on LEXIS or
Westlaw reveals dozens of cases, even in the last several years, where
courts have misapplied the Gore factors, the State Farm test, or both.
For instance, in 2001, an intermediate appellate court in Illinois
upheld all but $130 million of a $1.18 billion award against an
insurance company in Avery v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. 77 Although the Supreme Court would not decide State
Farm for another two years, this Illinois state court apparently
ignored the mandate of the first and third guideposts of Gore, allowing
testimony that the insurer encouraged the nationwide use of non-
original equipment manufacturer (non-OEM) parts, a practice
considered deceptive in Illinois, but permitted, and in some cases
possibly even encouraged, in other states. 78 The court also allowed the
plaintiffs to show a videotape of a corrosion test of a non-OEM fender,
despite the insurer's objection that there was no evidence to show that
this fender had been installed on any policyholder's car during the
entire class period in question. 79
In addition, in Romo v. Ford Motor Co, a California Court of
Appeal upheld a $290 million punitive damages award, with
compensatory damages amounting to only $5 million, despite the fact
that some evidence was presented that the defense argued was both
75. See generally Cordell A. Hull, Feature Article, Extraterritoriality and Punitive Damages:
Is There a Workable System?, 70 DEF. COUNS. J. 439 (2003) (analyzing U.S. jurisprudence on
punitive damages and recommending that the Supreme Court take the first available
opportunity to clarify the appropriate standard for extraterritoriality considerations).
76. The case quotes the trial judge as saying "[a]s I read [Gore], I was struck with the fact
that a clear message in the case ... seems to be that courts in punitive damages cases should
receive more evidence, not less. And that the court seems to be inviting an even broader area of
evidence than the current rulings of the court would indicate." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 421 (2003).
77. 746 N.E.2d 1242, 1262 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (Avery 1).
78. Id. at 1254; see also Hull, supra note 75, at 441. The Illinois Supreme Court has since
granted an appeal, 786 N.E.2d 180 (Ill. 2002) (Avery I1), but this evidence probably should have
been declared inadmissible in the first place in light of Gore's prohibition of extraterritorial
evidence, particularly that which is not even illegal in other states.
79. Avery I, 746 N.E.2d at 1262 (unpublished portion under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23,
see 166 Ill. 2d R. 23 (2005)).
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based on out-of-state conduct 80 and involved "pieces of supposed
knowledge of many different people on many different topics through
many different decades."81 Although this decision was later vacated
and remanded in light of State Farm, the evidence at issue should at
least have been evaluated, if not held inadmissible, in light of the Gore
case. Ironically, the Ninth Circuit, which includes the state of
California, concluded in a different case the same year that a punitive
damages award which may have been based in large part on evidence
of the conduct of Ford (the same defendant as in Romo) in other states
with regard to the manufacture of one of its trucks, must be reversed
and reconsidered in light of the territorial restraints established by
Gore.8 2
Even after State Farm, though, courts continue to misinterpret,
misapply, or ignore the Supreme Court's guidance on the prejudicial
effect of extraterritorial and unrelated conduct.83 On remand, the
Fifth Circuit California Appellate Court in Romo did reduce the
award, but focused on the "ratio" guidepost of Gore instead of the
80. Hull, supra note 75, at 441.
81. Romo v. Ford Motor Co., 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 158 (Cal. App. Ct. 2002) (internal
quotation omitted), overruled in part by People v. Ault, 95 P.3d 523 (2004) (Romo 1).
82. White v. Ford Motor Co., 312 F.3d 998, 1020 (9th Cir. 2002), amended by 335 F.3d 833
(9th. Cir. 2002).
83. Although beyond the scope of this Note, there is evidence that many lower courts have
failed to apply other aspects of the Supreme Court's Gore analysis faithfully as well. See, e.g.,
Clark v. Chrysler Corp., 310 F.3d 461, 482 (6th Cir. 2002) (stating, under the third guidepost,
that "automobile manufacturers are generally on notice that their reckless conduct resulting in
death could trigger a substantial punitive damages award"); American Pioneer Life Ins. Co. v.
Williamson, 704 So. 2d 1361, 1366 (Ala. 1997) (seemingly adding an additional guidepost that
"any punitive damages award should remove any profit realized ... as a result of [the
appellant's] misconduct"); Union Sec. Life Ins. v. Crocker, 709 So. 2d 1118, 1122 (Ala. 1997)
(allowing a 123:1 punitive-to-compensatory-damages ratio and ignoring the statutory penalty in
the Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act because it was too low to be relevant); Life Ins. Co. of
Georgia v. Johnson, 701 So. 2d 524, 531 (Ala. 1997) (ignoring the comparable statutory penalties
because they were too low to be relevant); Brantner Farms, Inc. v. Garner, No. C6-01-1572, 2002
WL 1163559, at *7 (Minn. Ct. App. June 4, 2002) (disregarding a comparable sanction of $1000
because it was not sufficient to deter behavior in the future); Paracelsus Health Care Corp. v.
Willard, 754 So. 2d 437, 445 (Miss. 1999) (upholding a 150:1 punitive to compensatory damages
ratio on the grounds that there were no other sanctions that could be imposed under the facts of
the case); Wightman v. Consol. Rail Corp., 715 N.E.2d 546, 555 (Ohio 1999) (stating that a
relevant civil penalty for comparison would be the potential award which could be handed down
in another civil lawsuit); Williams v. Aetna Fin. Co., 700 N.E.2d 859, 871 (Ohio 1998) (stating
that "when one of the guideposts is particularly relevant, a lesser reliance on the other
guideposts may be justified"). The preceding line of cases suggests that, even absent the
evidentiary concerns articulated in this note, the Gore and State Farm holdings should be
codified; if for nothing else, codification would instruct lower courts as to how properly to apply
all three guideposts in order to apply the meaningful, searching de novo review of punitive
damages awards envisioned by the Supreme Court in Cooper Industries v. Leatherman Tool
Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
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evidentiary principles underlying the decision in State Farm.8 4 This
analysis seemed somewhat disingenuous, especially considering the
language used in the opinion85 , as well as the fact that Gore preceded
this case, which demonstrates that there was no reason why this
guidepost could not have been more faithfully applied on the first
appeal.8 6 In addition, in Simon v. San Paolo U.S. Holding Company, a
real estate case alleging fraud and breach of contract, a California
appellate court amazingly applied State Farm to uphold a jury verdict
of $5,000 in compensatory damages and $1.7 million in punitive
damages.8 7  Besides quite surprisingly upholding this 340-to-1
punitive to compensatory damages ratio, the court also affirmed the
verdict despite a State Farm-like objection by the defense that the
trial court admitted arguably unrelated evidence regarding certain
deeds and liens recorded after the property was sold to a third party,
as well as "testimony relating to compensatory damages that were not
awarded in the first trial."8 8
Finally, in Markham v. National States Insurance Co., an
action by the beneficiary of an insured alleging breach of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, the Tenth Circuit oddly rejected a State
Farm-based objection to the presentation of extraterritorial evidence
of insurance policy rescissions over the past five years.8 9  In a
somewhat baffling and cursory section of the opinion, the Court held
that the admission of the evidence of out-of-state rescissions was
proper, distinguishing State Farm. The Court held State Farm was
distinguishable because a) the State Farm trial was bifurcated; b) in
this case, the conduct dated back five years, instead of twenty years;
and c) this case was unlike State Farm in that in State Farm, all of the
evidence of past nationwide practices was presented by an expert
witness.90 There was absolutely no discussion of how the out-of-state
evidence at issue bore a sufficient nexus to the harm complained of by
84. Romo v. Ford Motor Co., 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 793, 799, 810-13 (Cal. App. Ct. 2003) (Romo II).
85. The Romo II court stated that "considered in light of products liability actions against
large corporate defendants for which single-digit multipliers may simply be a cost of doing
business ... the court's conclusion is far from 'obvious.'" Id. at 803.
86. Gore was decided in 1996. BMW of No. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 559 (1996). The
first appeal to Romo was decided in 2002. Romo I, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 139.
87. 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 367, 387-93 (Cal. App. Ct. 2003). California was able to consider as
persuasive authority the Court's opinion in State Farm presumably because of the similarity of
that state's evidentiary rules to the Federal Rules of Evidence.
88. Id. at 381.
89. Nos. 03-6275 & 03-6304, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 25805, *14, *18-19 (10th Cir. Dec. 14,
2004). The attorney for the defense objected based on Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 402, and
403. Id.
90. Id. at 18-19.
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the plaintiff. Cases like Romo, Simon, and Markham clearly
demonstrate why a new rule of evidence is sorely needed.
There is also an economic argument that cuts in favor of
amending state and federal rules of evidence to better implement the
Gore and State Farm concerns. As multimillion and multibillion
dollar punitive damages awards become more commonplace, as they
have over the past decade and a half,91 more and more plaintiffs will
begin to seek such damages because of the large payoffs they
potentially contain. This phenomenon will have several adverse
consequences. Again, as scholar Mark A. Klugheit has noted, this will
change lawyers' trial strategies, as punitive damages will be
transformed from a "derivative," or secondary, claim to the claim at
issue in the case, potentially leading to longer and more costly
litigation.92 Next, the possibility of high punitive damage awards
could raise transaction costs to the point where many defendants are
pressured into settling potentially meritless claims. 93
Lastly, and somewhat more speculatively, is the idea that
Supreme Court review of punitive damages awards probably will not
be available with the frequency and tenacity witnessed in the past
decade, as the Supreme Court will instead look to influence other
areas of tort law. One scenario which may bring about this change is
an alteration in the political makeup of the Court. Although for
different reasons, Justices Ginsburg, Scalia, and Thomas all dissented
from the opinion in State Farm, and future appointees may come to
agree with Justice Ginsburg that "this Court has no warrant to reform
state law governing awards of punitive damages. '"94 Alternatively, the
Court may simply tire of such "passive aggressive" behavior on the
part of state appellate courts who disingenuously apply State Farm
because they are "chafing under the imposition of federal standards to
the exclusion of well-settled [state] rules. '95 Quite simply, the sheer
volume of large punitive damages awards cases could mean that many
of these awards will be allowed to escape Supreme Court review and
stand in the future, in the absence of a statutory rule.96
91. Murphy, supra note 1, at 996.
92. Klugheit, supra note 73, at 807-08.
93. See Dan Schechter, Two Post-Campbell Punitive Damage Decisions Apply Liberal
Punitive Damage Ratios, COMMERCIAL FINANCE NEWSLETTER, Dec. 8, 2003, at 101 (discussing
Romo and Simon).
94. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 438 (2003) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).




Related to this argument, the potential for abuse in plaintiff-
friendly areas (with rules of evidence patterned on the Federal Rules)
such as Mississippi, West Virginia, Creek County, Oklahoma, and
Madison County, Illinois make amending the rules of evidence a
practical necessity to guide trial courts in using wisely the discretion
provided to them by evidence law, particularly in class action
lawsuits.97 In areas such as these, where large punitive damages
awards are already more likely to be awarded, meaningful direction on
evidentiary rulings is sorely needed, both at the trial court level and
at the intermediate appellate court level. 98 This is because compared
to higher levels of appellate review, appeals are heard in a more
timely manner, judicial review is less expensive, and legal errors can
be corrected sooner rather than later in the trial and intermediate
appellate courts. Further complicating the problem of waiting for
appellate courts to correct large punitive damages verdicts is the fact
that the cost of appellate review is causing some states to eliminate
procedures such as remittitur, thereby handcuffing appellate courts to
an even greater degree. 99  Without statutory direction, punitive
damages are likely to continue to rise and appellate review may not be
able to handle the ensuing flood of appeals arising from punitive
damages cases.
B. Policy Arguments for Change
Many judges and tort scholars view the legal battle for
monetary and evidentiary limits in punitive damages cases as a
microcosm for a larger battle regarding the fundamental functions of
tort law as a whole. For instance, the California appellate court that
decided Romo on remand focused much of its discussion on competing
theories of tort law, rather than on the Gore and State Farm
framework.100 Of course, nearly everyone recognizes that the purpose
97. See American Tort Reform Association, Judicial Hellholes 2004, available at
http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/report.pdf, (including these jurisdictions as "judicial
hellholes" or as getting an "honorable mention" for being a "judicial hellhole"). Although the new
Class Action Fairness Act may work to effectively prohibit some of the forum-shopping concerns
articulated by defendants in large class action cases, see Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005), I
argue that such evidentiary consistency is still needed in these jurisdictions for the small class
actions lawsuits that can avoid the Act, if nothing else.
98. For a discussion of some of the "wild" interpretations of Gore that have taken place at
the state intermediate appellate level, see supra note 83.
99. For instance, the State of Missouri eliminated the process of remittitur in 1985,
Firestone v. Crown Center Redevelopment Corp., 693 S.W.2d 99, 110 (Mo. 1985), but it was
eventually reinstated by the legislature in 2004. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.068 (2004).
100. See Romo v. Ford Motor Co., 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 793, 793 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (discussing the
purposes of punitive damages and the manner in which courts should determine punitive
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of imposing punitive damages is to punish and to deter reprehensible
conduct,101  but concrete differences begin to appear when
commentators inquire about the correct measure of punitive
damages-and the correct procedure for imposing them-within one of
these overriding theories of tort law.
Professor John Goldberg has identified six of the major
competing theories of tort law, which he has labeled "the traditional
account," "compensation- deterrence theory," "enterprise liability
theory," "economic deterrence theory," "social justice theory," and a
collection of opinions he considers "individual justice theories.'1 2 The
traditional account, Goldberg recounts, understood actions in tort as
personal to the victim, or in other words, conceived tort law "as a law
of personal redress rather than as a law of public regulation or
punishment."'1 3 Compensation-deterrence theory, by contrast-at
least by the emerging twentieth century-views tort law as an
important component of the administrative state, in which tort rulings
represent societal statements regarding the social desirability or
undesirability of a form of conduct. 0 4 The focus of enterprise liability
theorists, however, is the extremely poor manner in which tort law
provides relief for tort victims whb seek redress in the tort system. 0
The primary reforms articulated by these theorists, then, are
procedures which enable the judiciary to more efficiently act as a relief
agency for accident victims. 0 6
Next, economic deterrence theorists posit the overriding goal of
"tort law is to promote overall social welfare by [efficiently] deterring
accidents in the future."'1 7 Thus, the objective of this body of law is to
minimize the sum of three considerations: the costs of accident
prevention, the costs resulting from accidents, and the costs of
administering the tort system. 08 In other words, tort law promotes
damage awards in order to carry out these purposes most effectively); Ford Motor Co. v. Romo,
538 U.S. 1028, 1028 (2003). This is somewhat ironic since Romo was vacated and remanded in
light of the court's holding in State Farm.
101. See, e.g., BMW of No. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996) ("Punitive damages
may properly be imposed to further a State's legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct
and deterring its repetition."); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991) ("[Plunitive
damages are imposed for purposes of retribution and deterrence."); Cooper Indus., Inc. v.
Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001) (stating that punitive damages are aimed
at deterrence and retribution).
102. John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 516 (2003).
103. Id. at 517.
104. Id. at 524.
105. Id. at 537.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 544.
108. Id. at 545.
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the most social welfare when the threat of liability causes actors to
take all and no more than "those precautions that cost less than the
harms likely to occur if those precautions are not taken."10 9 Standing
in stark contrast to this, social justice theorists state the goal of tort
law is to serve as a mechanism for "rectifying imbalances in political
power" by empowering diffuse individuals to "sue corporations for
misconduct outside of the legislative and regulatory process," where
they are protected by interest-group politics. 110 Finally, the individual
justice theories consist of libertarian theory, which seeks to reconnect
tort with laissez-faire concepts; reciprocity theory, which, as its name
suggests focuses on a "justice-based conception of tort law"; and
corrective justice theory, which states that the goal of tort law should
be to "restore the injured plaintiff to the status quo ante."111
Within each of these theories there exists a particular
theoretical approach to the imposition of punitive damages on tort
defendants. Economic deterrence theory, for example, which focuses
on the socially optimal level of deterrence, clearly would, in most
cases, seek to impose a smaller punitive damages penalty on a
corporate defendant than would social justice theorists, particularly
when the tortfeasor committed the tort unintentionally.1 1 2
Institutional reforms, then, in theories supporting lower punitive
damages awards, would clearly focus at the evidentiary level of
increasing the burden on plaintiffs seeking punitive damages in order
to reach a more optimal level of payouts. 1 3
Many state appellate courts, however, seem to subscribe to the
compensation-deterrence theory in punitive damages cases. For
instance, in Romo on remand, the California appellate court made no
secret of its broader, more compensation-deterrence-like view of tort
law, and its dislike of the traditional account of tort law:
The idea of awarding punitive damages based purely on a conception of torts as private
wrongs lost favor in the era of products liability litigation .... [O]utrageous or malicious
wrongdoing was no longer simply an affront to the dignity of a single victim. Instead,
the affront was ... viewed as one to society as a whole. In this view... punitive
damages awards needed to be based on the overall scope of the wrong in order to punish
109. Id. at 545. See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987) (presenting economic models of alternative liability rules and
discussing the tort law guidelines necessary to promote economic efficiency).
110. Goldberg, supra note 102, at 560.
111. Id. at 563-70.
112. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 109, at 160-65. Although some may argue there is some
evidence of outlier cases, see, e.g., Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 677-78 (7th
Cir. 2003) (in which the Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Posner, upheld a punitive award
with a 35:1 ratio), many of these cases, including Mathias itself, involve evidence of intentional
wrongdoing by the defendant and also feature alleged wrongs which are very hard to detect.
113. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 102, at 553-60.
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and deter the mass torts [citation omitted]. As the issue became ... more a question of
preventing outrageous large-scale wrongdoing, it was thought that, in order to be
effective, punitive damages had to render the overall conduct unprofitable or
prohibitively costly ... [W]e applied the broad standards for punitive damages
established by California case law in our original opinion in this case. To be sure, such
standards were subject to limitations or "guideposts" established in [Gore]. But, as
evidenced in our original opinion, we applied these guideposts in light of the broad
purposes and broad measure of punitive damages, in which courts undertook to actually
deter a practice or course of conduct by depriving the wrongdoer of profit from the
course of conduct or making such conduct so expensive it put the wrongdoer at a
competitive disadvantage. [citation omitted] "Punishment and deterrence" in this view
is far along a scale that might be viewed as increasing from mere admonition toward
direct incapacitation. 1
14
As the court noted, this "broad" view of punitive damages tort
law conflicts with some of the language in State Farm, in which the
Court appeared to indicate its wish to redirect punitive damages
litigation, and the evidentiary limitations therein, more toward the
"traditional account" side of the tort theory spectrum. 115 As State
Farm admonished, "[a] defendant's dissimilar acts, independent from
the acts upon which liability was premised, may not serve as the basis
for punitive damages. A defendant should be punished for the conduct
that harmed the plaintiff, not for being an unsavory individual or
business."116
With this in mind, it is clear that an important policy rationale
for amending the rules of evidence to enforce the State Farm
evidentiary limitations is to prevent some of the courts that endorse
the broader conceptions of tort law from allowing juries to impose
punitive damages on corporate defendants because they perceive
themselves as having an administrative or regulatory-like "duty" to do
so. 117 One critique of these broader theories is that the individual
defendant is often not the primary payer of the tort judgment.118
Arrangements such as liability insurance, experience-rating, and
other indemnification contracts cover some or all of the damages
114. Romo v. Ford Motor Co., 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 793, 800-01 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
115. Id. at 801:
State Farm, in our view, impliedly disapproved this broad view of the goal and
measure of punitive damages. Instead, as a matter of due process under the federal
Constitution, the court adopted the more limited, historically based view of punitive
damages [citation omitted]. In doing so, the court in State Farm went beyond the
"guideposts" established in Gore and articulated a constitutional due process
limitation on both the goal and the measure of punitive damages. Further, the result
is a punitive damages analysis that focuses primarily on what defendant did to the
present plaintiff, rather than the defendant's wealth or general incorrigibility.
116. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422-23 (2003).
117. See Goldberg, supra note 102, at 524, 537 (noting the historical trend of tort law
towards cases being based on "judges' conceptions" of social norms and discussing enterprise
liability theory).
118. Id. at 531.
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imposed, which makes the proposition that tort law is an ideal vehicle
for deterring anti-social conduct a shaky one. 119 More importantly, the
Supreme Court indicated that imposing such a regime on an
individual defendant is an unfair and sometimes unconstitutional
burden. 120 The only fair application of punitive damages can be when
the damages award seeks to punish and deter conduct that has a
"nexus" to the harm suffered by the plaintiff.' 21 As the law only asks
juries to take into account relevant evidence, not unduly prejudicial,
specific to the parties involved in the litigation, it is important that
evidentiary rules pertaining to punitive damages cases reflect a more
traditional account of the purpose of tort law.
In addition, it should be noted that the Federal Rules of
Evidence in many cases embrace the concept, embedded in State
Farm, that evidence law should take a cautious approach to evidence
that seeks to make a defendant appear more culpable based on prior
bad acts committed against a separate and distinct entity. This
cautious approach holds true even if those acts were unlawful. In
addition to Rule 403, which excludes such evidence if overly
prejudicial or repetitive,1 22 Rule 404(b) also limits the introduction of
"other crimes, wrongs, or acts" presented to show "action in conformity
therewith" on a particular occasion.1 23 The rationale behind this rule
is similar to the rationale articulated by the Supreme Court in Gore
and State Farm. As the Advisory Committee's Note states, such
evidence "tends to distract the trier of fact from the main question of
what actually happened on the particular occasion" and "subtly
permits the trier of fact to reward the good man and to punish the bad
man because of their respective characters despite what the evidence
in the case shows actually happened."1 24
Finally, a few words must be said to counter the obvious
argument against amending the Federal Rules of Evidence, which
asks why such an amendment is needed when the Supreme Court has
already spoken on the issue. The most important response to this
counterargument is that lower courts are not following the guidance of
the Supreme Court or Rule 403. This Note identifies many instances
of lower courts misapplying, either due to a misunderstanding of the
119. Id. at 531, 532.
120. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425. By "unconstitutional," this Note is referring to an
arbitrary deprivation of property under Due Process. Id.
121. Id. at 422-24.
122. FED. R. EVID. 403.
123. FED. R. EVID. 404(b). One can argue that one of the purposes behind the Hearsay Rule,
in some instances, is also to avoid this type of propensity reasoning.
124. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) adv. comm. note.
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case law, due to a lack of statutory guidance, or due to a desire to
protest, the framework of Gore and State Farm.125 Amendments to the
federal evidence rules-which will hopefully lead to amendments to
the state rules which are patterned after them-will provide courts
with more guidance, and perhaps heavier penalties, if they continue
their "passive-aggressive" disregard for Gore and State Farm.126
Furthermore, appellate review of pre-trial evidentiary rulings is
inefficient, costly, and should not always be needed or expected. 127
Finally, Rule 403 and its state equivalents give too much discretion to
the trial court in punitive damages situations to admit prejudicial
evidence with little relevance to the tort at issue. In many situations,
the initial ruling on the 403 balancing test by the trial judge is
deferred to,128 and without more statutory guidance, appellate courts
may only continue to give cursory review to such evidentiary
determinations.
Of course, a valid counterargument to this point is that the
Supreme Court's evidentiary pronouncements in Gore and State Farm
are less than crystal clear, and that lower courts are simply doing
their best to act in accordance with a balancing test with very little
guidance toward specific factual and evidentiary situations. Though
this argument should not be given short shrift, I would argue that the
Court, at the very least, sought in Gore and State Farm to exclude
evidence exactly like that deemed inadmissible in those two cases-
namely, extraterritorial evidence with no relation to the tort at issue,
evidence of conduct in other states which is not even illegal, and other
types of evidence that clearly has no "nexus" to the specific harm
complained of, such as evidence of "bad practices" in other sections of a
defendant's business. 129 Although a rule that attempts to enforce just
this (arguably unclear) language would still lead to "gray areas" in the
law, it perhaps would induce lower courts to exclude some of the
"borderline" evidence discussed in this Note, which in turn would
produce a more efficient judiciary-by reducing the chance of verdicts
being overturned on appeal-and help to perpetuate a system that is
125. For a further discussion of this phenomenon, see supra note 83.
126. See Schechter, supra note 93, at 101.
127. For a further discussion of this point, see supra Section III.A.
128. See, e.g., Freeman v. Package Mach. Co., 865 F.2d 1331, 1340 (1st Cir. 1988) ("[O]nly
rarely - and in exceptionally compelling circumstances - will we, from the vista of a cold
appellate record, reverse a district court's on-the-spot judgment concerning the relative weighing
of probative value and unfair effect."); United States v. Currier, 836 F.2d 11, 18 (1st Cir. 1987).
129. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 421-24 (2003).
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more cautious about the imposition of such large punitive damages
awards. 130
V. CONTENTS AND APPLICATION OF THE NEW RULE
In the majority opinion in State Farm, Justice Kennedy
quipped that "[u]nder the principles outlined in [Gore], this case is
neither close nor difficult."'131 While this statement may or may not
have been true (the three separate dissents almost surely would
disagree), the problems that the lower courts have had in applying
Gore and State Farm132 bring to mind the oft-quoted warning that
"easy cases make bad law."'133 Thus, the aim of the new Federal Rule
of Evidence, as well as any state rule fashioned for similar reasons,
should be to give more guidance to lower courts regarding which items
of evidence, due to their low probative value, potential to unfairly
influence the jury, or lack of "nexus" to the specific harms at issue in
the trial, should never see the inside of the courtroom. 3 4 The result of
such a rule should be more uniformity in the application of Gore and
State Farm by the lower courts, increased efficiency, and greater
fairness to defendants in punitive damages cases. With this in mind,
the following section focuses on some aspects of the new rule which
are necessary to achieve these goals.
A. Suggested Contents of the New Rule
While the exact wording of the new Federal Rule of Evidence is
beyond the scope of this Note, there are certain essential provisions
130. For an example of a case which supports this view by recognizing the evidentiary
principles articulated in State Farm and applying them correctly, see Woodward v. Corr. Med.
Services. of Ill,, Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 930-31 (7th Cir. 2004). In Woodward, the Seventh Circuit
rejected a State Farm-based objection to the admission of "pattern and practice" evidence by a
defendant private health services contractor, finding that the evidence was admissible because it
was, unlike State Farm, limited to evidence of misconduct by the same defendant, at the same
correctional facility, to similarly-situated persons as the plaintiff (in this case, suicidal or
mentally-ill prisoners). Id.
131. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 418.
132. For a discussion of some of the most glaring misapplications of Gore and State Farm,
see supra Part IV.
133. See, e.g., Burnham v. Super. Ct. of Cal., County of Marin, 495 U.S. 604, 640 (1990)
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S.
773, 804 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
134. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (providing the rule for excluding evidence where its "probative
value is substantially outweighed" by pragmatic considerations, e.g. "unfair prejudice"; State
Farm, 538 U.S. at 421-22 (discussing the probative value of extraterritorial conduct).
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that the rule should contain in order to encompass the holdings of
Gore and State Farm and provide further guidance to lower courts in
making important and controversial evidentiary decisions. At a
minimum, it is imperative that the new rule contain the following core
concepts.
1. The Rule should only apply where punitive damages are "in play."
With regard to the scope of the new rule, it is clear it should be
applied only in cases where punitive damages are sought by the
plaintiff. This first makes intuitive sense because the evidentiary
holdings in Gore and State Farm focused primarily on punitive
damages cases and how the inflammatory evidence presented at the
two respective trials could have skewed the jury's idea of
"reprehensible conduct."135 Secondly, because compensatory damages
are easier for a jury to quantify, 136 the margin of error is decidedly
smaller, and hence Rule 403's balancing test provides an adequate
proxy in itself for trial courts to filter out such unwarranted
evidence. 137
2. The Rule should make clear that it is triggered when evidence is
proffered to demonstrate extraterritorial conduct, conduct which was
legal where it occurred, and conduct which fails the "nexus"
requirement of State Farm.
In delineating what situations trigger the rule, the drafters
should rely heavily on the evidence criticized by the Court in Gore and
State Farm.138 Specifically, the rule should be triggered when a claim
135. BMW of No. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 575-78 (1996); State Farm, 538 U.S. at 413-23.
136. See, e.g., C.J. Martin, Dardinger v. Anthem Blue Cross and Blue Shield: Judicial
Redistribution of Punitive Damage Awards, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1649, 1668 n.123 (2003)
(noting that punitive damages, unlike compensatory damages, are "unpredictable and
unlimited").
137. For instance, evidence about the general reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct
offered by a plaintiff in a tort case in which no punitive damages were sought would rightly be
deemed inadmissible under Rule 403 because its potential to mislead or confuse the jury would
outweigh its probative value. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (stating that relevant evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by risk of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, or undue delay). This is because such evidence could only come in to judge the
"outrageousness" of the defendant's conduct in order to determine if punitive damages are
warranted, and thus could only mislead the jury in a case in which punitive damages are not
sought. Hence, there would be no need for the new rule, based solely on punitive damages cases,
to be applied.
138. Changing the impact of the Federal Rules of Evidence to conform to recent Supreme
Court interpretations of the Constitution is far from a novel concept. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 702
adv. comm. note. (noting the changes to the rule based on the Supreme Court's decisions in
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for punitive damages is based on extraterritorial evidence, or
similarly, evidence of conduct which is legal in the jurisdiction where
it occurred. 13 9 Also, regardless of whether the conduct took place in
the relevant jurisdiction, the rule should also be triggered when it
appears that the defendant's actions lack a sufficient "nexus" to the
harm suffered by the plaintiff. 140 In defining with greater specificity
the "nexus" requirement, the comments to the rule should point out
that, as stated in State Farm, the evidence must bear relation to the
plaintiffs harm to escape the application of the rule.141 For instance,
evidence presented with the sole purpose of demonstrating that the
defendant is an "unsavory individual," or is generally unfair in dealing
with its employees or customers, will trigger the application of the
rule. 142  Similarly, evidence of general corporate policies which
resulted in little or no harm to the specific plaintiff, but could be seen
as bad for society in general, would likewise be weighed by the new
rule. 143 Clearly, the rule should also state the converse of the above-
evidence that bears a strong relation to the harm alleged by the
plaintiff and demonstrates the defendant's unlawful conduct within
the relevant jurisdiction, would not trigger the rule. 144
3. The Rule should impose a more stringent balancing test that
displaces the test currently required by Rule 403 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence.
The most important part of the new rule would be the portion
defining its application. When triggered, the rule should require trial
judges to perform a balancing test to determine whether the evidence
in question should be admitted. Obviously, the rule should require
judges to perform this test only after the judge determines that the
proffered evidence meets the minimum standard of relevancy under
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,
526 U.S. 137 (1999)).
139. The Supreme Court in Gore criticized the use of both of these types of evidence under
both the "Reprehensibility" and "Sanctions for Comparable Misconduct" prongs. Gore, 517 U.S.
at 572, 579-80, 583-86.
140. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 422.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 423.
143. See id. (criticizing the trial court for admitting evidence which was characterized as
demonstrating harm "minor to the individual but massive in the aggregate").
144. This Note does not suggest that the wealth of the defendant should be a trigger for the
new rule, although the drafters may want to consider the personal wealth of the defendant as
having a greater potential to mislead or prejudice the jury. For a discussion of how evidence of
the defendant's wealth may unduly influence the jury, see Robbennolt, supra note 4, at 123-24,
and Hull, supra note 75, at 445-47.
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Rule 401.145 More meaningfully, though, the rule should mandate
that its balancing test should be undertaken by the trial court in place
of the usual Rule 403 inquiry. Of the utmost importance, the new rule
should remove the presumption in favor of inclusion which
accompanies the ordinary Rule 403 analysis. 146 In other words, while
the new balancing test should resemble the ordinary 403 test in
requiring the judge to weigh the evidence's probative value against its
potential to confuse, mislead, or unduly prejudice the jury, 147 the
evidence should not be admitted unless its probative value outweighs
the negative effects it may have. Furthermore, in addition to
considering the evidence's potential to delay the proceedings or to
confuse, mislead, or unduly prejudice the jury,148 the trial court should
also be required to consider the potential that inclusion would result
in the jury punishing the defendant for "being an unsavory individual
or business" instead of for its wanton conduct with respect to the
specific plaintiff.149
The underlying policy behind these changes is clear. The
comments to the new rule should indicate that this particular
procedure should be employed in the new rule because of the peculiar
and far-reaching dangers inherent in punitive damages cases. Such
dangers include the fact that punitive damages are unpredictable,
harder for juries to forecast, and provide greater potential for
staggeringly large verdicts because of the lack of any sort of cap on the
amount that juries can award. 150 Thus, inflammatory evidence can
have a much bigger impact on the amount of the award than it could
in cases where only compensatory damages are sought.
In providing further guidance in the application of the new
balancing test, the comments to the rule should incorporate several
important principles from Gore and State Farm which would give
more relevant items of evidence a greater chance of overcoming the
heightened burden in the new rule. First, both Gore and State Farm
recognized that evidence of recidivism can be more probative than
evidence of one-time malevolent conduct. 151 With this in mind, the
145. See FED. R. EVID. 401, 402 (admitting evidence that has the tendency to make the
existence of a material fact more or less probable, unless otherwise excluded by the Rules).
146. Rule 403 allows the evidence to be admitted unless its probative value is "substantially
outweighed" by its potential to mislead or confuse the jury, or to cause undue prejudice, delay, or
waste of time. FED. R. EVID. 403.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 423 (2003).
150. See generally Martin, supra note 136 (explaining the dual nature of punitive damages,
and defending the judiciary's right to award punitive damages to third party beneficiaries).
151. BMW of No. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 577 (1996); State Farm, 538 U.S. at 423.
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comments to the rule should indicate that trial judges are free to treat
evidence of recidivism as having greater probative value than ordinary
evidence, provided that the pattern and practice of such conduct has a
sufficient nexus to the harm complained of by the plaintiff.' 52 The
inquiry would thus mirror a Rule 404(b) inquiry into evidence
regarding other crimes, wrongs, or acts by the defendant to show proof
of intent, preparation, plan, or absence of mistake.153 Evidence of
recidivism, therefore, would have a good chance of admission under
the new rule if it tended to show the defendant engaged in repeated,
similar types of malevolence towards the plaintiff or people like the
plaintiff. If the evidence were offered, however, simply to show two or
more unrelated bad acts by the same defendant, just to demonstrate
that he or she is "evil" and hence probably acted in an evil manner
toward the plaintiff, the evidence would likely be deemed
inadmissible, just as if Rule 404(b) were applied. 154
In addition, the comments to the rule should also note that the
probative value of a piece of evidence may also increase based on the
underlying claim for punitive damages. The Gore case indicated as
much, creating a functional hierarchy where violent torts were more
reprehensible than non-violent torts, and where non-violent torts
involving "affirmative acts of misconduct," such as "trickery and
deceit," were more reprehensible than mere negligence. 155 Thus, the
rule may want to counsel trial courts that where an application of the
rule is particularly close, whether the stricter burden of the new rule
should be imposed could depend on the underlying claim of the
plaintiff. Evidence offered in tort cases involving battery, wrongful
death, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress 156 should be considered more probative than evidence simply
tending to show an economic injury resulting from a reckless or
negligent disregard for the law.
Lastly, in terms of the limitations of the new rule, the drafters
should be sure to state that the rule is not intended to displace or
152. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 423. State Farm frames the inquiry in terms of
reprehensibility--evidence of recidivism is more reprehensible than an individual instance of
conduct, and hence may be punished more severely. Id. According to the Supreme Court, the
pattern and practice inquiry should look to whether the past conduct replicates the current tort,
and whether the "existence and frequency of similar past conduct" suggests a pattern of
malevolence. Id. (quoting Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1991)).
153. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
154. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) adv. comm. note.
155. Gore, 517 U.S. at 575-76.
156. This is particularly true with regard to cases involving wrongful death by intentional
act and in jurisdictions where intentional infliction of emotional distress claims can only be
brought if they result in a physical injury.
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override any other rule of evidence. 157 The only time where the new
rule would trump an existing rule is when its balancing test would
replace the Rule 403 inquiry in punitive damages cases where one of
the rule's triggers has been met.158 Therefore, the new rule would
remain consistent with Supreme Court precedent holding that
evidence which would be admissible under one rule but is deemed
inadmissible under another rule may still be admitted by the trial
court.159 The effect of this provision would be that the new rule would
not subvert the drafters' intent, embodied in the existing rules, that a
relevant item of evidence be deemed admissible. The only exception to
this statement would be the instance where a trial court would seek to
admit evidence contrary to the spirit of Gore and State Farm cases,
and then only if punitive damages were sought and the evidence
would not be admissible under any other rule.
B. Application of the New Rule
The advantages of the proposed rule can clearly be realized
when the rule is applied to a few specific factual scenarios. First,
consider this hypothetical. Say Paula Plaintiff sues her employer,
Donald Defendant in tort, for battery and sexual harassment under
157. The suggested language of such a provision would be "This rule shall not be construed
to limit the admission or consideration of evidence under any other rule except Rule 403." For
similar language, see FED. R. EVID. 413(c), 414(c), and 415(c).
158. Of course, an alternative proposal would be for the new rule's balancing test to simply
be performed before the Rule 403 inquiry, but the rule would still allow a trial judge the
discretion to perform the ordinary 403 test afterwards. Practically, though, this proposal is
somewhat less desirable because of the dearth of instances where a proffered item of evidence
would overcome the new rule's test and then be deemed inadmissible by Rule 403. One of very
few examples would be this: say Peter Plaintiff sues Don Defendant for the tort of battery in the
mythical state of "Defendantland," where the state constitution affords extra protections to tort
defendants in cases where the tort has a criminal counterpart. Say that one of the additional
protections is that Defendant may exercise a right not to testify. Assume also that
Defendantland has adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence in its entirety into the state code. In
this case, Plaintiffs proffered evidence that Defendant had previously been convicted for
assaulting Plaintiffs father and his brother under similar circumstances would arguably
overcome the new rule's test-it is specific evidence indicating similar acts of violent malevolence
in the past. If Defendant wished to stipulate to the fact of his conviction in a strategic move to
prevent Plaintiff from presenting the specific details of the prior conviction, however, the
proffered evidence of past conduct would arguably be deemed inadmissible under the less
stringent 403 test. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 190 (1997) (holding that the
prosecution's general interest in presenting its version of the facts carries very little weight when
the point at issue is a defendant's uncontested legal status). Thus, in areas where tort
defendants are afforded extraordinary testimonial protections, drafters may want to leave Rule
403 in effect residually after the application of the new rule.
159. United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 56 (holding that "there is no rule of evidence which
provides that testimony admissible for one purpose and inadmissible for another purpose is
thereby rendered inadmissible; quite the contrary is the case.").
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Title VII of the United States Code, 160 seeking compensatory and
punitive damages. Plaintiff claims that Defendant repeatedly
subjected her to unwanted sexual contact at work while she was in his
employ. Plaintiff also wants to present evidence that Defendant has
two prior criminal convictions for fondling female employees, against
their consent, for the purposes of his sexual gratification during
working hours. This scenario would arguably not even trigger the new
rule, if the conduct was sufficiently similar or it fell within a
jurisdictional exception for sex-based offenses. Even if it did, however,
because the previous instances occurred out-of-state or the previous
claims were not sufficiently similar to the plaintiffs allegation, the
balancing test mandated by the new rule would, appropriately, allow
the trial court to admit this evidence.
First, the trial judge would correctly note that the probative
value of this evidence is high, indicating recidivism and a pattern and
practice of battering subordinate women. Furthermore, the judge
would heed the comments to the rule that indicate that violent torts
are more likely to overcome the rule than economic ones. Next, the
nexus of these instances to the harm suffered by the plaintiff should
easily overcome the prejudicial value of the evidence. Finally, even if
the judge wavered under the new rule because of the danger that a
jury may award excessive punitive damages based solely on the fact
that the defendant was a "bad person," the provision that the new rule
cannot be used to limit the application of any other rule would force
the trial court to admit the evidence under Rule 415.161 Thus, the new
rule would not sweep too broadly in requiring courts to declare
inadmissible previously relevant and admissible evidence of related
malevolent conduct.
More examples of the benefits of the new rule can be realized
by applying the new rule to prior cases. First, consider Avery. 162 In
Avery, as discussed above, the trial court erred in at least two
respects. First, the court allowed a plaintiffs witness to testify that
the defendant insurer encouraged the use of non-OEM (original
equipment manufacturer) parts nationwide, despite the fact that such
practice was permitted, if not encouraged, in several states outside of
160. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. The Court has recognized that sexual harassment and hostile
work environment claims are both actionable under Title VII, even though neither of these terms
appear in the statute. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 751-52 (1998).
161. See FED. R. EVID. 415(a) (providing that in civil cases based on sexual assault, evidence
of a party's commission of another offense of sexual assault is admissible as provided in Rules
413 and 414).
162. Avery v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co, 746 N.E.2d 1242 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (Avery
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Illinois, the home jurisdiction.1 63 Secondly, the court allowed the
plaintiff to show a videotape of a corrosion test of a non-OEM fender,
despite the fact that there was no evidence to show any policy holder
in the class period ever had such a fender installed.' 64
Under the new rule, both of these errors would be corrected.
With respect to the evidence of the insurer's encouraged use of non-
OEM parts in other jurisdictions, this would trigger the new rule in
two separate ways-the evidence seeks to punish based on
extraterritorial conduct, and the evidence demonstrates conduct which
was not illegal where it occurred. An application of the rule would
then remove the presumption in favor of admission in ordinary
circumstances,' 65 and force the trial court to note the danger of this
evidence misleading the jury, as well as the danger that it will result
in the defendant being punished simply because it has behaved
(arguably) unscrupulously in an unrelated context. Thus, the
evidence of the use of non-OEM parts outside of the home jurisdiction
would fail the new rule's test, and would be deemed inadmissible.
The court would reach the same result with respect to the
corrosion test. Since it could not be proved that a member of the class
within the jurisdiction actually used such a non-OEM fender, evidence
of such conduct would trigger both the "not illegal where it occurred"
and "nexus" prongs of the new rule. The probative value would be
deemed low because the evidence does nothing to prove fraud within
the class, and the danger of misleading and prejudicing the jury would
be deemed high by the trial judge under the rule, due to its potential
to make the defendant appear "unscrupulous" in general, and not
culpable with respect to the specific allegation of fraud. The trial court
would have no alternative but to declare the evidence inadmissible.
Another case which would come out differently under the new
rule is Jimenez v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.'66 In Jimenez, the trial court
rightly admitted expert testimony suggesting that the car
manufacturer had negligently designed a liftgate with a "headless
striker" latch, causing the liftgate to fly open upon impact. 167 The
expert did not testify, however, that other improvements to the overall
163. Id. The use of non-OEM parts was deemed illegal in Illinois but not in other states. See
also Hull, supra note 75, at 441 (noting that the jury award in Avery was directed at a practice
that was prohibited in Illinois, but legal in other states).
164. Avery I, 746 N.E.2d at 1262 (unpublished portion under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23,
see 166 Ill. 2d R. 23 (2005)).
165. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (stating that relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by risk of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or undue
delay).
166. 269 F.3d 439 (4th Cir. 2001).
167. Id. at 456.
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strength of the latch would have prevented the liftgate from opening.
Despite this, the trial judge allowed the plaintiff to present evidence of
other accidents allegedly caused by the latch's overall weakness, and
not the specific fact that the latch did not have a head. 168
Under the new rule, the evidence of other accidents would not
have been admitted. The fact that the accidents were based on a
design decision not proven to be negligent by the plaintiff in this case
would trigger the rule by appearing to be outside of the "nexus"
requirement of the rule. Accordingly, the presumption of admissibility
in place under Rule 403 would disappear, 169 and the trial judge would
note that the evidence's probative value is low compared to its
potential to mislead or confuse the jury. Specifically, the new rule
would suggest that there is a heightened danger in this particular
case of the jury rendering a high punitive damages award on the
assumption that the car manufacturer unscrupulously designs weak
latches in general, and not because the headless latch design was
particularly reckless and wanton and caused the plaintiffs injury.
Furthermore, if it were a close decision, the trial court could note the
rule's instructions that torts based on mere negligence are more likely
to fall within the prohibition than torts involving affirmative
misconduct.
Lastly, the decision in John Deere Co. v. May provides a
particularly useful factual scenario for applying the new rule.170 In
that case, the plaintiffs estate instituted a products liability and
wrongful death suit against a bulldozer manufacturer, claiming that
the "dozer" was negligently designed to shift into gear despite being
locked in neutral.171 The plaintiff wanted to admit as evidence a
videotape of such an occurrence, as well as evidence of a different
products liability suit involving a self-shifting dozer. 172 The defendant
objected, noting that the videotape and the prior lawsuit involved a
different model dozer, with different adjustments, and dissimilar
amounts of wear and tear on the transmissions.173 The trial court
admitted the evidence after applying the balancing test mandated by
Texas's equivalent of Rule 403.174
168. Id. The Fourth Circuit found this evidentiary determination to be in error, yet
inexplicably found the error to be harmless. Id.
169. FED. R. EVID. 403.
170. 773 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. App. 1989).
171. Id. at 371.
172. Id. at 371-72.
173. Id. at 372.
174. Id. The trial court, later in the trial, did give the jury a weak limiting instruction with
respect to the prior case, but not with respect to the videotape. Id. at 374-75. The Court of
Appeals of Texas, Waco Division, affirmed the decision of the trial court. Id. at 372. Although
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Under the new rule, this factual scenario may or may not have
come out differently, but at least it would have been given more than
the cursory examination given by the trial and appellate courts in this
case. First, the fact that the proffered evidence involved different
dozers with different levels of wear would probably have created
enough of a "nexus" problem to trigger the rule and its stricter
balancing test. When applied, the trial court would have to note the
substantial probative value of the evidence-namely, the repeated
instances of self-shifting in similar models under similar
circumstances. 175
The potential to prejudice the jury and to disadvantage this
defendant in particular, however, would also be very high. Initially,
there is the danger that the jury would infer that the defendant was
grossly negligent based on malfunctions of different, older models.
Furthermore, there is the specific danger that substantial punitive
damages would be awarded based only on the prior acts or on the
supposition that all of this defendant's products are "bad" because
models with more wear had failed in the past. The new rule counsels
that the trial court should then look to the underlying claim in such
close cases. Here, the underlying claim alleged both affirmative
misconduct-a knowing failure to warn with conscious indifference to
the result-and simple negligence-with regard to the products
liability claim. 176 In the end, the evidentiary determination would
probably come down to how well the plaintiff alleged the affirmative
misconduct portions of his claim. If the plaintiff could compile ample
evidence that the manufacturer knew of the defect, and it could be
inferred that there was a reasonable probability that defect was not
model-specific, than the evidence should probably go to the jury.177 If
this were just a subsidiary claim with little evidence to suggest its
outside the scope of this Note, it is interesting to note that that court also misread state products
liability precedent in affirming the decision. John Deere claimed that the evidence should not
have been admitted because the plaintiffs failed to prove that the other incidents had occurred
under "reasonably similar" circumstances. Id. The court rejected the argument that the
incidents did not occur under reasonably similar circumstances. Id. In butchering the standard
for reasonably similar circumstances, the court stated "Deere's ... argument, that the dozers had
to be reasonably similar before there could be a reasonable similarity of circumstances, is
rejected because that would have required proof of identical circumstances. Identical
circumstances are not required." Id.
175. Id. at 371-72.
176. Id. at 371-73. The products claim was based in part on a conscious decision not to alter
the dozer further despite knowledge of existing problems. Id.
177. State Farm noted that evidence of lawful, extraterritorial conduct may be considered
more probative when it demonstrates the "deliberateness and culpability of the defendant's
action in the state where it is tortious," and it has the sufficient "nexus" to the plaintiffs alleged
harm. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422 (2003).
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validity, however, then the policy of avoiding inflammatory evidence
with a high potential to prejudice the jury, particularly in regard to
large corporate defendants, should control.
This last hypothetical raises one final but extremely important
point about the purpose and limitation of the new rule that this Note
proposes. A balancing test can never fully cabin the discretion of a
trial judge, and this Note does not propose that this would be a good
idea.178 It is clear, however, that trial courts are continuing to take
advantage of the existing balancing test and admitting evidence that
is misleading the jury, resulting in skewed punitive damages awards.
To the effect that this new rule leaves some discretion in the trial
judge to make evidentiary determinations under a balancing test, it
does so in a significantly restricted manner. Hence, it is an
unqualified improvement on the existing punitive damages regime.
VI. CONCLUSION
As Gore, State Farm, and their aftermath prove, there is no
simple answer when it comes to balancing the competing ideals of
punishing and deterring harmful conduct and minimizing the risk of
"arbitrary deprivations of property" under the Due Process Clause. 179
Add to this the larger problem that these conflicting goals butt heads
inside the greater context of a tort system that is struggling for a new
identity,180 and it becomes almost impossible to forge a consensus.
One point, however, remains clear. Punitive damages verdicts
have reached an unhealthy level in this country. While many
commentators have focused on different solutions, this Note embraces
the practical and efficient notion that reform should start at the trial
level, whether or not the decisions in Gore and State Farm require it.
By preventing fact finders, by way of statute, from even considering
the type of barely relevant and highly misleading evidence criticized
by the Supreme Court, the American legal system can take an
important step toward striking the delicate balance so desperately
needed in punitive damages cases today. With this in mind, the best
way of influencing trial judges is by amending the Federal Rules of
Evidence, and substantially similar state provisions, to indicate why
178. As the advisory comments to Rule 404(b) state, there can be no mechanical solution to
tough evidentiary questions. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) adv. comm. note.
179. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 432 (1994).
180. See generally Goldberg, supra note 102 (analyzing the various idealized theories of tort
law).
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and how the evidence at issue in Gore and State Farm should be
excluded. Not only will this solution restore uniformity and efficiency
to the punitive damages regime, but it will constitute an important
step back toward a system which, consistent with Due Process, only
seeks to punish a defendant and reward a plaintiff on the basis of
their individual interaction with each other, and not the sum of their
dealings with society as a whole.
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How Mead Has Muddled Judicial
Review of Agency Action
Lisa Schultz Bressman 58 Vand. L. Rev. 1443 (2005)
In United States v. Mead Corp., the Supreme Court held that
an agency is entitled to Chevron deference for interpretations of
ambiguous statutory provisions only if Congress delegates, and the
agency exercises, authority to issue such interpretations with "the
force of law." The Court did not define "force of law," and thus did
not determine what type of agency procedures fit within Mead. Four
years have passed since the Court decided Mead, and despite
numerous court of appeals decisions, we still do not know when an
agency is entitled to Chevron deference for interpretations issued
through procedures less formal than notice-and-comment
rulemaking or formal adjudication. Lower courts agree that, after
Mead, agencies must issue interpretations in formats that reflect
some indicia of lawmaking authority. But they lose focus thereafter.
First, lower courts employ different analytical frameworks to
determine the relevant indicia of lawmaking authority, making
Chevron deference turn more on the decisional preference of a
particular court than on the procedural choice of a particular
agency. Second, lower courts cite uncertainty about Mead as a
reason to avoid extending Chevron deference exclusively or at all,
and take easier routes that may restrict agency interpretive
flexibility. Finally, lower courts read Mead to address a question
more general than intended - namely, whether agencies possess
delegated authority to issue interpretations governing the scope of
their own authority, even through notice-and-comment rulemaking.
In the process, they ignore what little guidance Mead provides on the
significance of notice-and-comment rulemaking for Chevron
eligibility. If justified in so doing, they nonetheless turn the decision
somewhat on its head, reading it as relevant to determining when an
explicit delegation of interpretive authority is necessary rather than
when an implicit one is present. As Justice Scalia predicted in his
dissent, the consequences of Mead have not been good.
After surveying the chaos in the lower courts, this Article
calls for a new approach to Chevron analysis that accommodates
procedural innovation within defined bounds. Thus, the Article
finds little help in Justice Breyer's recent effort in National Cable &
Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services to clarify
Mead. And it neither advocates Justice Scalia's solution of
abandoning the focus on procedural formality nor endorses the
Court's current position, which recognizes the significance of
procedural formality but permits Congress or agencies unbounded
room to create procedures that are more efficient than the relatively
formal ones we have come to accept for administrative lawmaking.
The Article could defend a formalistic approach that restricts Mead
to notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication. But it
ultimately argues for a more nuanced approach that allows
Congress to design and agencies to invoke informal procedures
without sacrificing Chevron eligibility so long as those procedures
generate interpretations that are transparent, rational, and binding.
It further contends that this approach is consistent with the best
reading of Mead and its erstwhile partner, Barnhart v. Walton.
